interesting Ontological argument for god by Alvin Plantinga

1: God is defined as a maximally great being. after all, what can be greater than a god other than, say, a greater still god?

2: It is possible that a maximally great being exists

3: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. When I say possible world, I do not mean universe or planet or solar system, just a description of reality

4: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. Otherwise it would not be maximally great, because surely it is greater to exist in all possible worlds than merely one or a few possible worlds.

5: If a maximally great being exists in every *possible* world, then a maximally great being exists in the actual world

6: If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists

7: Therefore, God exists.

tell me your thoughts.

I disagree.RadBooley

Conversely, there is this - which actually makes sense:

Then why call him God? 

The whole arguement is based on the assumption that the first statement is true.II_Seraphim_II

1: God is defined as a maximally great being. after all, what can be greater than a god other than, say, a greater still god?

2: It is possible that a maximally great being exists

3: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. When I say possible world, I do not mean universe or planet or solar system, just a description of reality

4: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. Otherwise it would not be maximally great, because surely it is greater to exist in all possible worlds than merely one or a few possible worlds.

5: If a maximally great being exists in every *possible* world, then a maximally great being exists in the actual world

6: If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists

7: Therefore, God exists.

tell me your thoughts.

NTWrightfan

Alternatively, I have just defined a smelly person called Bob. Bob is maximally smelly; a God of smelliness, if you will. Something actually maximally smelly is smellier than something smellier only in imagination. Therefore, to be maximally smelly, Bob must exists; therefore, Bob exists. How great is that?

The whole arguement is based on the assumption that the first statement is true. For all you know there are multiple "gods" for multiple dimensions of earth. It just depends which religion you are going by because ancient greeks believed in multiple gods, and that automatically nullifies your arguement. And you may not agree with Ancient Greek or Ancient Egyptian beliefs, but they are as valid as any Christian or Muslim or Jewsih beliefs because the only proof they have and require is faith.II_Seraphim_II

that being said, God exists.

This argument always fails because it depends on the fact that a supreme being exists in the world.

You can't prove that God exists with an argument that assumes he exists in the first place.

The arguement already assumes that the first "step" is true, where-as there is no proof to verify if it's correct or not.

Therefore, this arguement is pointless circular reasoning.

The conclusion only works if you believe a scale actually exists to rate what is great, or tiny. Scales, values, measurements, are all forms of communication for describing. They are valueless without a biological entity to  to give them value for means of standardized communication.

I don't think you can say this proves god exists. It just shows you how humans work, if it shows anything at all. And that's  how we always value what's bigger than us. WE see a big guy walking down the streat we awesome he's powerful, even if this may not be true.

1: God is defined as a maximally great being. after all, what can be greater than a god other than, say, a greater still god?

2: It is possible that a maximally great being exists

3: If it is possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world. When I say possible world, I do not mean universe or planet or solar system, just a description of reality

4: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. Otherwise it would not be maximally great, because surely it is greater to exist in all possible worlds than merely one or a few possible worlds.

5: If a maximally great being exists in every *possible* world, then a maximally great being exists in the actual world

6: If a maximally great being exists in the actual world, then a maximally great being exists

7: Therefore, God exists.

tell me your thoughts.

NTWrightfan

you only proved it is possible for god to exist... 

Essentially, the argument boils down to this:

1. Assume God exists.

2. God exists.

Q.E.D.

Conversely, there is this - which actually makes sense:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?

Then why call him God?

RicardoIII

Now we can go with the first implicit assumption of this argument and assume that morals are objective and that they exist independently of God. The only way God would be able to prevent evil would to commit a gross infringement on human free will. This of course would be, in itself, evil, and possibly more evil than letting evil exist.

But let us continue onto another pitfall of this argument. By assuming that evil exists, one assumes that objective moral values exist. if one assumes this, then the moral argument, as outlined by William Lane Craig, is validated.

Premise 1: If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

Premise 2: Objective moral values do exist

conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

the riddle of epicurus commits suicide

[QUOTE="RicardoIII"]

Conversely, there is this - which actually makes sense:

 

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?

Then why call him God?

NTWrightfan

Now we can go with the first implicit assumption of this argument and assume that morals are objective and that they exist independently of God. The only way God would be able to prevent evil would to commit a gross infringement on human free will. This of course would be, in itself, evil, and possibly more evil than letting evil exist.

But let us continue onto another pitfall of this argument. By assuming that evil exists, one assumes that objective moral values exist. if one assumes this, then the moral argument, as outlined by William Lane Craig, is validated.

Premise 1: If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

Premise 2: Objective moral values do exist

conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

the riddle of epicurus commits suicide

Secondly, Premise 1 of your argument is ridiculous.

And there's the problem, right at the start. God is only a maximally great being if he actually exists. This assumption is the conclusion of your argument. Circular logic. ;) Funky_Llama

that really is nothing more than a giant strawman. nowhere is the statement "God exists" in my premises. the conclusion is arrived at through deduction.

Alternatively, I have just defined a smelly person called Bob. Bob is maximally smelly; a God of smelliness, if you will. Something actually maximally smelly is smellier than something smellier only in imagination. Therefore, to be maximally smelly, Bob must exists; therefore, Bob exists. How great is that?

Funky_Llama

This argument always fails because it depends on the fact that a supreme being exists in the world.

You can't prove that God exists with an argument that assumes he exists in the first place.

metroidfood

 

that really is nothing more than a giant strawman. nowhere is the statement "God exists" in my premises. the conclusion is arrived at through deduction.

NTWrightfan

 

you assume that a maximally smelly being exists

NTWrightfan

[QUOTE="metroidfood"]

This argument always fails because it depends on the fact that a supreme being exists in the world.

You can't prove that God exists with an argument that assumes he exists in the first place.

NTWrightfan

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"][QUOTE="RicardoIII"]

Conversely, there is this - which actually makes sense:

Is God willing to prevent evil, but not able? Then he is not omnipotent.
Is he able, but not willing? Then he is malevolent.
Is he both able and willing? Then whence cometh evil?
Is he neither able nor willing?

Then why call him God?

Funky_Llama

Now we can go with the first implicit assumption of this argument and assume that morals are objective and that they exist independently of God. The only way God would be able to prevent evil would to commit a gross infringement on human free will. This of course would be, in itself, evil, and possibly more evil than letting evil exist.

But let us continue onto another pitfall of this argument. By assuming that evil exists, one assumes that objective moral values exist. if one assumes this, then the moral argument, as outlined by William Lane Craig, is validated.

Premise 1: If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

Premise 2: Objective moral values do exist

conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

the riddle of epicurus commits suicide

Secondly, Premise 1 of your argument is ridiculous.

how is premise 1 ridiculous? could you give me a basis for objective moral values within naturalism? now remember, I don't mean a standard to live by, and I dont mean motivations for acting moral, I mean a basis by which we can say that something is actually and objectively evil.

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"]

 

that really is nothing more than a giant strawman. nowhere is the statement "God exists" in my premises. the conclusion is arrived at through deduction.

Funky_Llama

 

you assume that a maximally smelly being exists

NTWrightfan

[QUOTE="II_Seraphim_II"]The whole arguement is based on the assumption that the first statement is true. For all you know there are multiple "gods" for multiple dimensions of earth. It just depends which religion you are going by because ancient greeks believed in multiple gods, and that automatically nullifies your arguement. And you may not agree with Ancient Greek or Ancient Egyptian beliefs, but they are as valid as any Christian or Muslim or Jewsih beliefs because the only proof they have and require is faith.NTWrightfan

that being said, God exists.

You see but thats the problem. "God" can only be described as he is in religious texts. Its possible for a being to be maximally great and still not be god. I mean if we humans went around the entire universe and extinguished all forms of greater life form, that wouldnt make us gods, it would just make us the most evolved. The above arguement is based on a description of god you give to us.

[QUOTE="metroidfood"]

This argument always fails because it depends on the fact that a supreme being exists in the world.

You can't prove that God exists with an argument that assumes he exists in the first place.

NTWrightfan

You're still assuming God exists, just in a different possible world.

Also, for the Riddle of Epicurus, you also assume that objective morals exist. More circular reasoning.

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"][QUOTE="metroidfood"]

This argument always fails because it depends on the fact that a supreme being exists in the world.

You can't prove that God exists with an argument that assumes he exists in the first place.

Funky_Llama

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="NTWrightfan"] I am absolutely stunned that this "Riddle of Epicurus" is often hailed as one of the greatest, if not the greatest argument for the existence of God. Before I tackle the other charges lobbed against Plantinga's ontological argument, I want to tackle this first.

 

Now we can go with the first implicit assumption of this argument and assume that morals are objective and that they exist independently of God. The only way God would be able to prevent evil would to commit a gross infringement on human free will. This of course would be, in itself, evil, and possibly more evil than letting evil exist.

But let us continue onto another pitfall of this argument. By assuming that evil exists, one assumes that objective moral values exist. if one assumes this, then the moral argument, as outlined by William Lane Craig, is validated.

Premise 1: If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

Premise 2: Objective moral values do exist

conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

the riddle of epicurus commits suicide

NTWrightfan

Secondly, Premise 1 of your argument is ridiculous.

how is premise 1 ridiculous? could you give me a basis for objective moral values within naturalism? now remember, I don't mean a standard to live by, and I dont mean motivations for acting moral, I mean a basis by which we can say that something is actually and objectively evil.

And as for objective moral values... there is a very, very big problem here. Your argument's conclusion is that God exists. Thus, premise 2 must prove, without assuming God's existence (since that would be circular logic) that there are objective moral values. So that challenge actually rests on you.

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="NTWrightfan"]Oh, you don't explicity state it. But your argument relies upon it.

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"]

you assume that a maximally smelly being exists

DeeJayInphinity

I never assumed that God exists of course.

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="NTWrightfan"] that is actually demonstrated by premises 3 through 5NTWrightfan

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"][QUOTE="metroidfood"]

This argument always fails because it depends on the fact that a supreme being exists in the world.

You can't prove that God exists with an argument that assumes he exists in the first place.

metroidfood

You're still assuming God exists, just in a different possible world.

Also, for the Riddle of Epicurus, you also assume that objective morals exist. More circular reasoning.

as for the riddle of epicurus, THE RIDDLE ITSELF PRESUPPOSES THAT OBJECTIVE EVIL EXISTS!

I never assumed that God exists of course.

NTWrightfan

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="NTWrightfan"] I am absolutely stunned that this "Riddle of Epicurus" is often hailed as one of the greatest, if not the greatest argument for the existence of God. Before I tackle the other charges lobbed against Plantinga's ontological argument, I want to tackle this first.

 

Now we can go with the first implicit assumption of this argument and assume that morals are objective and that they exist independently of God. The only way God would be able to prevent evil would to commit a gross infringement on human free will. This of course would be, in itself, evil, and possibly more evil than letting evil exist.

But let us continue onto another pitfall of this argument. By assuming that evil exists, one assumes that objective moral values exist. if one assumes this, then the moral argument, as outlined by William Lane Craig, is validated.

Premise 1: If God does not exist, objective moral values do not exist

Premise 2: Objective moral values do exist

conclusion: Therefore, God exists.

the riddle of epicurus commits suicide

NTWrightfan

Secondly, Premise 1 of your argument is ridiculous.

how is premise 1 ridiculous? could you give me a basis for objective moral values within naturalism? now remember, I don't mean a standard to live by, and I dont mean motivations for acting moral, I mean a basis by which we can say that something is actually and objectively evil.

Hate to butt in, but I can't resist theological debate, it seems. To me, it is not  the first premise, but rather the second premise that is ridiculous. I completely agree with your first premise. I don't believe such a thing as "objective moral values" exist. This is where i'm confused by your post. Do you believe that human morals are predetermined by something outside of human control?

It's simple: you assumed that the definition of God as a maximally great being is true. After all, if God does not exist, then he is not maximally great. The assumption that he is maximally great - and thus, does exist - is made.Funky_Llama

2: It is possible that a maximally smelly being exists

3: If it is possible that a maximally smelly being exists, then a maximally smelly being exists in some possible world. When I say possible world, I do not mean universe or planet or solar system, just a description of reality

4: If a maximally smelly being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world. Otherwise it would not be maximally smelly, because surely it is smellier to exist in all possible worlds than merely one or a few possible worlds.

5: If a maximally smelly being exists in every *possible* world, then a maximally smelly being exists in the actual world

6: If a maximally smelly being exists in the actual world, then a maximally smelly being exists

7: Therefore, Bob exists.

\o/

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"]It's simple: you assumed that the definition of God as a maximally great being is true. After all, if God does not exist, then he is not maximally great. The assumption that he is maximally great - and thus, does exist - is made.NTWrightfan

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"][QUOTE="Funky_Llama"]It's simple: you assumed that the definition of God as a maximally great being is true. After all, if God does not exist, then he is not maximally great. The assumption that he is maximally great - and thus, does exist - is made.Funky_Llama

what if I told you that I dont think that it is possible for a maximally smelly to exist? after all, smelliness is a quantitative measurement. the only way to be maximally smelly would actual infinite smelliness. Howveer, actual infinites are self-contradictory. NTWrightfan

Secondly... the smelliness isn't important. Feel free to replace it with the adjective of your choice, and bingo, you can 'prove' virtually anything. Maximally pathetic, maximally stupid... it's a world of possibilites. :P

[QUOTE="Funky_Llama"][QUOTE="NTWrightfan"] what is wrong with ascribing "maximal greatness" to God or a god? secondly, I prove through deduction that a maximally great being exists. NTWrightfan

okay, I looked up a defense of the ontological argument, and Funkyllama, I should point out that maximal greatness has a maximal value. a maximally great being would be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. These 3 are qualitative, not quantitative statements. those which you pointed out, like maximally smelly, are quantitative statements which can always be greater. NTWrightfan

Does the existence or nonexistence of something actually change it in any way?

Suppose I tell you that I have a penny in my pocket. You'll immediately know what I mean and that picture will form the full and complete definition of what it means for something to be a penny. Absolutely nothing is changed when I reveal whether or not I actually have a penny in my pocket.

Thus, the existence or nonexistence of this supposed maximally great being cannot affect the extent of its greatness, as whether or not it exists has no relevance to the definition of what it is.

The argument is a valid argument, as if all the premises are true, the conclusion is true.  But the argument is unsound. Premises 3 and 4 are the unsound premises.  There could be a possible world (a way a world could be, or the reality of that world) that has no god.  That is a distinct possibilty. 

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"]okay, I looked up a defense of the ontological argument, and Funkyllama, I should point out that maximal greatness has a maximal value. a maximally great being would be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. These 3 are qualitative, not quantitative statements. those which you pointed out, like maximally smelly, are quantitative statements which can always be greater. GabuEx

Does the existence or nonexistence of something actually change it in any way?

Suppose I tell you that I have a penny in my pocket. You'll immediately know what I mean and that picture will form the full and complete definition of what it means for something to be a penny. Absolutely nothing is changed when I reveal whether or not I actually have a penny in my pocket.

Thus, the existence or nonexistence of this supposed maximally great being cannot affect the extent of its greatness, as whether or not it exists has no relevance to the definition of what it is.

The argument is a valid argument, as if all the premises are true, the conclusion is true. But the argument is unsound. Premises 3 and 4 are the unsound premises. There could be a possible world (a way a world could be, or the reality of that world) that has no god. That is a distinct possibilty.

Ring_of_fire

[QUOTE="Ring_of_fire"]

The argument is a valid argument, as if all the premises are true, the conclusion is true. But the argument is unsound. Premises 3 and 4 are the unsound premises. There could be a possible world (a way a world could be, or the reality of that world) that has no god. That is a distinct possibilty.

NTWrightfan

existence is also not a "perfection" or a great making feature of a substance.  That's where Descartes' Ontological argument falls as well.  I'm sure you know the argument against Descartes Ontological argument.  

Also, even if it was a great making quality, it is possible for there not to be a god in a possible world.  Which would make the god not maximally great, therefore, the argument is unsound

Here's the problem I always have with this argument: define "greatness" and explain how it can be objectively quantified.GabuEx

Ha this is the most sensible point in the whole topic. I consider George Bush (for argument's sake) to be maximally great, therfore he is god. Not too many would agree with that but prove me wrong. Based on your theroy he must be god in my mind. But you have not proved it in actuality. 

[QUOTE="NTWrightfan"][QUOTE="Ring_of_fire"]

existence is also not a "perfection" or a great making feature of a substance. That's where Descartes' Ontological argument falls as well. I'm sure you know the argument against Descartes Ontological argument.

Also, even if it was a great making quality, it is possible for there not to be a god in a possible world. Which would make the god not maximally great, therefore, the argument is unsound

Ring_of_fire

and please enlighten me as to how Descarte's ontological argument works and how it fails.

[QUOTE="GabuEx"]Here's the problem I always have with this argument: define "greatness" and explain how it can be objectively quantified.mattsnibbs

Ha this is the most sensible point in the whole topic. I consider George Bush (for argument's sake) to be maximally great, therfore he is god. Not too many would agree with that but prove me wrong. Based on your theroy he must be god in my mind. But you have not proved it in actuality.