In my experience, the people who believe there is a God are those who've sat down and thought about it rationally. We understand God as a being of infinite power--the greatest possible thing in existence. Since things that exist are greater than things that are just imaginary, then this idea of the greatest being must have the added attribute of existence. In other words, God MUST exist. mysterylobster
I might as well share a bit of my essy on topic
The ontological argument is one of the more interesting 'proofs' of the God hypothesis, not necessarily because it works in any successful way, but because it forces a deep examination of logic and language upon anyone who hears it. On its face value it appears faultless, yet most anyone who genuinely tries to use it as a stand alone proof for the existence of a supreme being will feel that there is something fundamentally wrong with it. This is a well founded feeling. When the argument is closely inspected it is readily noticeable that, due to confusion among the notions of existence, reality, conceptualization and greatness, it is fundamentally flawed. This flawed nature is also evident in the many counter examples which can be arrived at through the same line of reasoning. Both of these factors conspire to make the ontological argument impotent and well worth forgetting.
The Ontological argument originated from St Anselm, who in 1077-78 AD presented it in the second chapter of his Proslogium[1]. Since then it has undergone many modifications from the likes of Rene Descartes and Alvin Plantinga but each and every reiteration shares the same basic form and thus the same basic flaws. Anselm's original version was in the form of a reductio ad absurdium, an argument that presents a statement and then attempts to make it contradictory or incomprehensible, thus presumably making its inverse true. This original statement is the opinion of the fool that a being "than which nothing greater can be thought"[2] can exist in the mind but not in reality. From this starting point Anselm reasons that if the fool can conceive of this being in his mind then he can also conceive of it in reality as well. To exist in reality as well as the mind, he says, is greater than to exist in the mind alone and therefore a being who truly is that "than which nothing greater can be thought" must by necessity exist in reality. The fool's original statement is thus proven to be absurd and God, it seems, exists in reality and the mind.
The first and most obvious problem is that the argument is not applicable only to God. Even in Anselm's time the same form of argument was spoofed in an attempt to prove it irrelevant. The monk Guanilo, used Anselm's exact wording to try and prove the existence of "Lost Island", an island which is "superior in its abundance of riches to all other lands which are inhabited by man". Strictly speaking Guanilo's example was not a fair representation of the ontological argument because it only described an island greater than those inhabited by man. For the purposes of comparison I will alter his argument to mean that Lost island is the island than which no greater can be thought. If the argument takes this form then the conclusion can be reached that Lost Island does in fact exist. Plantinga rejects the validity of this counter-example, noting that an object like an island cannot have an "intrinsic maximum" and thus can always be imagined to be greater[3]. However, this objection assumes that the larger the features of Lost Island, such as the number of palm trees and the degree of temperature, the greater it is. If Plantinga's criteria for greatness were true then Lost Island's temperature would be well above the tolerable limit of human survival which would make it more like hell than the greatest island imaginable. Greatness, as Michael Martin suggests, is more appropriately set at an ideal value rather than a maximum[4]. If Lost Island is the greatest island conceivable then by necessity, part of its greatness must be its existence which means that Lost Island exists. Clearly though, there exists no such thing as an island which is as great as our imaginations will allow us to comprehend. The ontological argument has thus provided a false conclusion which means that it is invalid and somehow faulty.
First among these faults is the fact that the ontological argument is an example of circular logic. That is to say that it is an argument whose conclusion is asserted among its premises. Anselm, and almost every other philosopher who posited an ontological argument, surreptitiously asserts the existence of God in a statement describing or defining him. Anselm's argument said that God was the being "than which no greater can be thought" just like Descartes' which said that God "has all perfections"[5] and like Plantinga's which implied that God was the being of "maximal greatness"[6]. These statements seem innocent by themselves but when we examine them in hindsight of the later premises of the ontological argument, namely the premise that existence is a "great making" property, we see that they are essentially defining God with existence. The ontological argument thus takes the form of- 'God by definition exists therefore he exists in reality'- which is a laughable method of proving anything. At best this form of argument proves that God exists within his definitional conceptualization but not in reality[7].
A more important fault of the ontological argument is its confusion of existence and greatness. The crux of the argument and the factor which swings God from existence in the understanding to existence in reality or from possible existence to necessary existence is the notion that to exist in reality or by necessity is greater than to exist in the understanding or in a possible world. This all-important premise is untrue or at the least not necessarily true, as was originally demonstrated by Immanuel Kant in his Critique of pure reason. Existence, unlike properties such as power, wisdom and benevolence, is not a factor which alters the value of an object. To exist merely means that there is an object which corresponds with a concept, not that a concept includes the quality of existence.[8] In short existence is not a predicate of an object. Kant reasons that if existence was a predicate and did in fact change the value of something then it would be impossible for that thing to exist in the understanding and in reality[9]. For example a triangle is an object with the quality of having three sides and a one hundred and eighty degree sum of interior angles. We can conceptualize a triangle purely in the mind and we can also observe triangular shapes in reality. However if the ontological argument is correct and existing is a quality which grants added value then the imagined triangle and the existent triangle become two entirely different things. This isn't how things are in reality though. A triangle that is only imagined is still a triangle, just like a triangle that exists is still a triangle. The existing triangle may have a greater practical application but this is irrelevant to its value as a geometric shape. Existence therefore is confirmed not to be a predicate and as such the ontological argument's claim that an existing or necessary God is greater than an imagined one is false. The fool's original statement, that a being "than which nothing greater can be thought" can exist in the mind but not reality, thus retains its comprehensibility and no longer serves to point towards an existing God as the consequence of its contradictory nature.
Ontological arguments are by their nature practically worthless. Even if the faults of logic are not immediately perceived it is almost universally apparent that they are perceived by people as unconvincing and pedantic. Perhaps the idea of a definition or a conceptualization determining what exists in reality is simply abhorrent to practically minded people, perhaps the circular logic is all too obvious or perhaps at a fundamental level everyone understands that God cannot be proved or disproved by argument alone.
[1] Barnes, Jonathan, The Ontological argument (London, Macmillan, 1972) pg 1
[2] Ibid pg 2
[3] Plantinga, Alvin, God, Freedom and Evil (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1974) pg 91
[4] Martin, Michael, Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (United States of America, Temple University, 1990) pg 83
[5] Barnes pg
[6] Plantinga pg
[7] Martin pg 85
[8] Kant, Immanuel, "On the Impossibility of an Ontological Proof ofthe Existence of God", Critique of Pure Reason (London, Penguin, 2007) pg 504
[9] Ibid pg 505
Log in to comment